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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal raises several questions concerning the District Court's Memorandum Decision 
and Order on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgement that granted summary judgment in favor 
of the State of Idaho, by and through the Idaho Transportation Board ("ITB") and Idaho 
Transportation Department ("lTD" and sometimes hereinafter collectively 
dismissed the Appellant's Complaint. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
and 
This lawsuit commenced on October 27, 2009, when the Appellant Brian Woodworth 
(sometimes hereinafter "Woodworth" or "Appellant") filed a Complaint for damages arising from 
an accident that occurred on October 29,2007, during which a non-party motorist hit and injured the 
Appellant. See R. at 2-5. The Complaint named the State and the City of Nampa ("Nampa") as 
defendants and alleged negligence causes of action. See R. at 5-20. The State filed its Answer on 
December 23, 2009; Nampa file its Answer on January 25, 2010. See R. at 21-7 & 28-39. 
Thereafter, the parties engaged in discovery. 
The State and Nampa filed Motions for Summary Judgment and supporting on 
February 10,2011. See R. at 40-2; 78-83; 84-6 & 113- I 22. In support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the State submitted the Affidavit of Kevin Sablan and an Affidavit of Counsel. See R. 
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at 123-133 & 87-112. Notably, the Affidavit of Kevin Sablan states that the construction plans for 
the construction of the intersection at which the Appellant was injured, ITD Plan 3B29 for Federal 
Aid Project, Project No. U03281 (3) ("Plan 3B29") was prepared in or around 1954, and believed to 
be the most recent construction plans for the intersection at issue here, as well as the adjacent area. 
See R., at 124. 
Nampa filed the Affidavit of Kent Fugal in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
See R. at 43-77. Mr. Fugal's affidavit unequivocally states that Plan 3B29 was 
substantial conformance with the existing engineering or design standards in 
preparation. See R, at 53. 
at the time of 
The Appellant filed an Opposition, as well as an Affidavit of Counsel and the Affidavit of 
Edward Stevens. See R. at 142-182; 185-177 & 278-299. The State and Nampa filed Replies on 
March 3, 2011. See R. at 308-14 & 300-07. The Trial Court held oral argument on the two Motions 
for Summary Judgment on March 10,2011. See R. at 315-16. The State and Nampa filed 
supplemental memoranda on March 14, 2011 and March 15, 2011, respectively, to address a 
Washington appellate case that Appellant relied upon at the oral argument. See R. at 317 -21 & 322-
26. 
On April 21 ,2011, the Trial Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' 
Motions for Summary Judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of the State and Nampa. See 
R. at 327-349. The Trial Court entered a Judgment and Supplemental Judgment in favor ofthe State 
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on April 29,2011 and August 2, 2011, respectively. See R, at 352-54 & 366-67. The Appellant 
filed a Notice of Appeal on June 9, 2011. See R, at 355-63. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant alleges that Nampa and the State negligently failed to locate, design, construct, 
install and maintain for public convenience and safety that portion of the state highway system 
known as Eleventh A venue North and, more particularly, the intersection of Eleventh A venue North 
with Third Street North (hereinafter the "Intersection"). See, e.g., R, at 8. 11 Avenue North has 
a total of fi ve lanes of traffic: two northbound lanes, two southbound lanes and a middle turn lane. 
See R., at 328-29. The portion of 11 th Avenue North on which the accident occurred is part ofD.S. 
30. See R., at 328-29. 
Before the accident, on the evening of October 29,2007, Woodworth was shopping in Paul's 
Market, a business across from Intersection. See R., at 6. As alleged in his Complaint, if a person 
leaving Paul's Market intends to cross the street at a marked crosswalk, he or she must walk one 
block in either direction. See R., at 4. Appellant alleges that patrons regularly forego walking one 
block in either direction and instead cross directly in front of Paul's Market, where there is no 
marked crosswalk. See R., at 4. It is undisputed in this case that the Appellant left Paul's Market 
pushing a shopping cart and crossed 11 th Avenue North at the Intersection. See R, at 6. While 
crossing at approximately 7:30 p.m., Appellant was struck by a vehicle driven by a non-party and 
was injured. See R., at 6-7. 
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D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, the reviewing court applies the same 
standard as that which was applied by the District Court in granting summary judgment. Mackay 
v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008). 
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law. LR.C.P.56(c). 
II. 
RESPONDENTS' RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES THAT 
HA VE BEEN PRESENTED ON APPEAL BY THE APPELLANT 
I. Did the Trial Court correctly rule that Idaho Code § 6-904(7) applied to and provided 
governmental immunity to the State from the Plaintiff's causes of action? 
2. Did the Trial Court correctly find that the State's Highway Accident Location (HAL) 
program likely fulfilled any duties owed pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-21O? 
3. Did the Trial Court correctly find that the Appellant did not raise a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the State complied with HAL, or otherwise was negligent? 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the State contended that it was entitled to immunity 
from Appellant's claims pursuant to Idaho Code 6-904(7) because the highway at issue was 
engineered and designed in accordance with the standards at the time, and approved in advance of 
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construction. Furthermore, the State's monitoring program in place at the time assembling accident 
data for the Intersection and surrounding intersections indicated no deviation from any standard, 
which would require affirmative action on the part of the State. 
The Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the State on these two 
grounds. First, the Trial Court properly ruled that the State was immune from the Appellant's claims 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904(7). Second, the Trial Court properly found that, even if the State 
was not entitled to immunity under Idaho Code § 6-904(7), it likely discharged any statutory duties 
it owed. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that, in any event, the Appellant did not controvert the 
State's material facts on the issue of breach of duty. 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that Idaho Code § 6-904(7) Applied to and 
Provided Governmental Immunity From Appellant's Causes of Action. 
The Appellant contends that the Trial Court committed reversible error when it found that 
Idaho Code § 6-904(7) applied to and immunized the State from the Appellant's causes of action. 
In support of this argument, the Appellant argues that Idaho Code § 6-904(7) does not apply because 
his causes of action do not "arise" out of the design of the crosswalk. Instead, the gist of the 
Appellant's claims, so the argument goes, is that the State is liable for failing to inspect for 
dangerous conditions at the crosswalk, and correct them. The argument fails because it mis-
characterizes the Appellant's own causes of action and, as a result, mistakenly asserts that Idaho 
Code § 6-904(7) is not on point. 
Idaho Code § 6-904(7) is an immunity statute, which states in pertinent part: 
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6-904. EXCEPTIONS TO GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY. A 
governmental entity and its employees while acting within the course 
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent 
shall not be liable for any claim which: 
* * * * 
7. Arises out of a plan or design for construction or improvement to 
the highways, roads, streets, bridges, or other public property where 
such plan or design is prepared in substantial conformance with 
engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation of 
the plan or design or approved in advance of the construction by the 
legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or 
administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to such 
approval. 
In determining whether this provision applies, the threshold issue is whether the claims arise out of 
the "plan or design for the construction or improvement" of a state highway. 
Here, despite Appellant's tortuous attempts to persuade otherwise, the ineluctable fact is that 
his causes of action arise out of the "plan or design for the construction or improvement" of a state 
highway. Consider the following allegations contained in the Complaint: 
• The Intersection had "poor lighting" and lacked a "marked crosswalk or traffic 
warning signals. See R., at 4. 
• The Intersection "lacked traffic control devices, warnings or See R., at 
4. 
• As of the date of accident giving rise to the Complaint, the Intersection "still had no 
traffic control devices, warnings or markings designed to benefit the safety of 
pedestrians .... " The Intersection "lacked traffic control devices, warnings or 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - PAGE 8 
markings." See R., at 6 (emphasis added). 
These allegations constitute a plain and obvious attack on the "plan or design" of the 
Intersection, which undisputedly was created in or about 1954. Simply put, the Appellants assert that 
the "plan or design" of the Intersection was negligent or otherwise substandard because it lacked 
traffic control devices, markings or warnings ((designed" to benefit the safety of pedestrians. Stated 
another way, the design of the Intersection lacked improvements that, in Appellant' 
promote pedestrian safety. These allegations constitute a claim "aris[ing] out a plan or design 
construction or improvement" to a State highway. 
Likewise, Appellant's allegation that LTD should have initiated a competent traffic 
engineering study to identify and remedy perceived defects in Plan 3B29 further supports the State's 
contention that Appellant's claim arises out of a "plan or design for construction and improvement" 
to a State highway. In particular, the Appellant argues that a competent traffic engineering study 
would have warranted "enhancements," including upgraded lighting, four (4) pedestrian activated 
flashing yellow lights, two pedestrian diamond warning lights, and a safety island. These 
"enhancements" are another name for "improvements." They evidence a challenge to Plan 3B29 
because the Appellant asserts they would have increased pedestrian safety, 
decreased the possibility of the accident giving rise to this lawsuit. Trying to characterize the claim 
as a failure to inspect, improve and maintain the Intersection, as Appellant does, draws a specious 
and meaningless distinction, and represents a challenge to a plan that, as analyzed below, 
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substantially conformed with engineering and design principles that existed at the time it was 
prepared. Furthermore, under the Appellant's interpretation, all that is needed to undermine the plain 
language and intent ofIdaho Code § 6-904(7), is to frame one's claim in terms offailure to inspect 
for and remedy a perceived changed and dangerous condition. Such an interpretation would vitiate 
the design immunity statute, rendering it meaningless surplusage. 
Because the Appellant's causes of action allege claims that "arise[] out of a plan or design 
for construction or improvement" to a State highway, the analysis turns to whether the State can 
establish: 
(1) the existence of a plan or design that was (2) either prepared in substantial 
conformance with existing engineering or design standards or approved in advance 
of construction by the legislative or administrative authority. 
See Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454,886 P.2d 330,335 (1994). 
To prove the existence of a plan or design, an actual writing need not be proffered, and substantial 
conforma11ce to then-existing design standards could be established where a plan was made in 
compliance with, for instance, a national publication promulgated by the Federal Highway 
Administration. Id., 886 P.2d at 335. Unless a plaintiff refutes a government's showing that it has 
satisfied these two requirements, the government will have immunity under the statute. Brown 
v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 811,229 P.3d 1164, 1173 (2010) 
In this instance, the Trial Court did not err in ruling the State satisfied the Lawton elements. 
First, the Trial Court correctly found the existence of a plan, and, therefore, the first element in the 
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Idaho Code § 6-904(7) analysis is established. As the Trial Court acknowledged in its decision, the 
State relied in part on the Affidavit of Kevin Sablan ("Sablan Affidavit"). Attached as Exhibit A to 
the Sablan Affidavit is Plan 3B29, which was prepared in or around August 1954. See R., at 124. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Sablan stated his belief that Plan 3B29 was the most recent set of construction 
plans for the highway. See R., at 124. The Appellant, the Court observed, did not controvert the 
State's contention that Plan 3B29 was the most recent set of plans or designs for the highway. See 
R., at 345. As such, it is undisputed that a plan or design existed. 
Turning to the second prong, it is clear the Trial Court did not err in finding that Plan 3B29 
was approved in advance by an appropriate administrative body before 1955, and substantially 
conformed with the design and engineering standards in effect at the time they were prepared. For 
this element, the State relied on the Affidavit of Kent 1. Fugal, a consultant for the Co-Defendant 
Nampa. Mr. Fugal's affidavit unequivocally states that Plan 3B29 was prepared in substantial 
conformance with the existing engineering or design standards in effect at the time of preparation. 
See R., at 52. Additionally, the fact that construction was performed on the site years ago 
demonstrates a de facto approval of the plans through the ITD administrative process. See R., at 44. 
The Appellant did not dispute the evidence the State submitted. The Appellant relied on the 
report of its engineer, Edward Stevens. As the Trial Court emphasized in its memorandum decision, 
the Stevens' report opines whether the Intersection satisfies requirements set forth in a 2002 Federal 
Highway Administration study entitled Safety Effects of Marked Versus Unmarked Crosswalks at 
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Uncontrolled Locations for the installation of a marked crosswalk and other improvements. See R., 
at 345. But whether the Intersection satisfies the requirements of a report authored nearly fifty years 
(50) after the initial design of the Intersection is irrelevant to the issue of whether Plan 3B29 was 
prepared in substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect in 1954. 
Therefore, the Trial Court correctl y found that the second prong of the Lawton analysis was satisfied 
and that the State was immune from Appellant's claims pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904(7). 
Appellant's continued reliance on Roberts v. Transportation Department, 12 I Idaho 827 
P.2d 1178 eCt. App. 1991) and Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle, 153 Wash.App. 890, 223 P.3d 
1230 (2009) is irrelevant to whether the Trial Court correctly found that § 6-904(7) applied. The 
Appellant relies on Roberts v. Transportation Departlnent, 121 Idaho 727,827 P.2d 1178 (CL App. 
1991) for the proposition that the State cannot delegate its statutory duties. In Roberts v. 
Transportation Department, the plaintiff sued ITD for failing to erect and maintain proper traffic 
control signs. The district court granted ITD's motion for summary judgment because it found lTD 
either did not owe the duties that were allegedly breached to the plaintiff or was immune under the 
"discretionary function" exception to government liability pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904(1). Id. 
730, 827 P.2d at 1181. The court of appeals reversed the district court, concluding that ITD had a 
statutory duty to furnish, erect and maintain signs on its highways pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-201, 
and that ITD could not undermine that duty by promulgating contradictory rules. Nor could it avoid 
its statutory duties by delegating its duty to another entity. Id. 732, 827 P.2d at 1183. 
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The Appellant's reliance on Roberts v. Transportation Department lacks merit because, in 
that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals did not consider the effect of Idaho Code § 6-904(7) on the 
plaintiff's causes of action. Furthermore, it is clear the State could have non-delegable duties 
relating to the crosswalk at issue in this lawsuit, yet still enjoy immunity under Idaho Code § 6-
904(7). Indeed, "duty" is implicit in the concept of immunity statutes, which immunize a party for 
a breach of a duty, provided the immunity statute's requirements are met. 
Moreover, as the Trial Court correctly reasoned, the Appellant's on 
v. City of Seattle is of no assistance. First, unlike as in Chen, there is no evidence in this case that 
either the State or Nampa modified the Intersection or conducted a traffic study since its original 
design. But more importantly, the defense in Xiao Ping Chen v. City of Seattle was a common 
defense to a negligence action, specifically, that the plaintiff was outside the scope of a duty owed. 
By contrast, the defense at issue in this case is a statutory immunity defense, which has clear 
requirements if it is to apply. As analyzed above, the State satisfied the requirements ofIdaho Code 
§ 6-904(7), and the Appellant never offered disputing evidence. As such, the State is immune from 
the Appellant's claims. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court should affirm the Trial Court's CTr~intin 
judgment in favor of the State pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904(7). 
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B. The Trial Court Correctly Found that the State's Highway Accident Location 
(HAL) Program Likely Fulfilled Any Duties Owed Pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-
201. 
Idaho Code §40-201 and other related statutes makes a general pronouncement about the 
State's obligation regarding State highways. It states in pertinent part: 
40-201. STATE HIGHWAY, COUNTY HIGHWAY, HIGHWAY 
DISTRICTS AND CITY HIGHWAY SYSTEMS ESTABLISHED. '" The 
improvement of highways and highway systems is hereby declared to be 
established and permanent policy of the State Idaho, and 
imposed upon the state, in all counties, and highway districts in 
improve and maintain the highways within their respective jurisdiction as 
defined, within the limits of the funds available. (Emphasis added). 
Assuming that Idaho Code § 40-201 is specific enough to prescribe the required standard of 
conduct, I the State's HAL program satisfies the statutory mandate. As set forth in the Affidavit of 
Kevin Sablan, a District 3 traffic engineer, the State established the HAL program. See R, at 124. 
The HAL program identifies potential safety trouble spots on the State Highway system. See R., at 
124 & 91-112. The protocol of the HAL Program is set forth in the ITD's HAL Report 
Methodology. See R., at 91 112. The methodology for identifying potential trouble spots is based 
on a sophisticated formula which considers crash frequencies, the economic cost to society and the 
rate crash for the locations. See R., at 91-112 .. As part ofMr. Sablan's duties as a traffic 
I A court may rely on a positive enactment of law for the purpose establishing 
when: (1) the enactment clearly and unambiguously defines the required standard of conduct; 
enactment was intended to prevent the type of harm the defendant's violation of the enactment 
caused; (3) the plaintiff is a member of the class of persons the enactment was designed to protect; 
and (4) violation of the enactment was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Brizendine v. 
Nampa Meridian Irr. Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 586, 548 P.2d 80,86 (1976). 
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for District 3, which includes the Intersection, he reviews and analyzes HAL reports yearly to 
determine the top twenty locations within the District that pose a potential safety deficiency. See R., 
at 124. 
As the Trial Court observed, the District 3 HAL data that Mr. Saban reviewed before the 
accident involving the Appellant did not identify either the Intersection or any of the surrounding 
intersections as posing a potential safety problem. See R., at 124 & 346. Therefore, State not 
only monitored the entire highway system "within the limits of the funds available, but it lacked 
knowledge of any dangerous condition at the Intersection. By implementing and complying with its 
safety monitoring program, HAL, the State met any obligation it may have had under Idaho Code 
§ 40-201 or any statute.3 Thus, the Trial Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor 
of the State on the basis that the State discharged its statutory duties under Idaho Code § 40-201 with 
the monitoring scheme implemented with HAL. 
2 Traffic engineers for each ITD District are given reports for only the 
accident locations is a policy decision driven by financial limitations, and is 
"limit of funds available" language contained in Idaho Code § 40-201. 
3 To the extent Idaho Code § 40-201 triggered a duty to l1wintain the Intersection, it was 
discharged with the maintenance agreement it had with the City of Nampa. Idaho statutes permit 
the State to enter into such agreements with cities and highway districts for the maintenance of State 
highways running through cities, counties and other political subdivisions. See Idaho Code §§ 40-
310(5), (13), 502. 
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C. Even if HAL Did Not Fulfill Duties Owed Pursuant to Idaho Statutes, the Trial 
Court Correctly Found that the Plaintiff Did Not Raise a Genuine Issue of 
Material Fact As to Whether the State Was Negligent. 
The Appellant advanced a negligence theory of recovery against the State. In addition to its 
argument for immunity under Idaho Code § 6-904(7), the State contended that its HAL monitoring 
duty discharged any statutory duty it owed. In support of this argument, the State submitted the 
Affidavit of Kevin Sablan. The Appellant, in turn, did not dispute this material fact, which the Trial 
Court recognized as an independent basis upon which to grant summary judgment in favor of the 
State. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) governs the defense of a motion for summary judgment, 
and states in relevant part: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as 
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. 
The Trial Court did not err in ruling that the Appellant failed to submit facts demonstrating 
a triable issue. Although the Trial Court acknow ledged that the Appellant asserted that accidents had 
occurred at the Intersection, and that the City of Nampa modified the Intersection the 
Appellant's accident, it pointed out the Appellant did not create a genuine issue of material fact on 
the relevant issue of "whether or not the State complied with its own program for this particular 
intersection or that it has otherwise been negligent in light of the limitations as to funding that is built 
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into the duties imposed by LC. 40-201." See R., at 347-48. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that 
the Appellant did not "directly address" Sablan's statement that the Intersection was not identified 
as "highly dangerous." See R., at 347. Based on the foregoing, the Trial Court did not err in ruling 
that the State was entitled to summary judgment because the Appellant did not set forth facts 
evidencing a genuine issue of material fact. See I.R.c.P. 56(e). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decision and judgment of the District 
Court granting summary judgment in favor of the State. 
Respectfully Submitted this 
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day of December 201l. 
r~ I i 
Michael E. Kelly J 
Attorney for the respondents 
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